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1. Introduction  
Information protection has been an important part of human life from ancient time. In 
computer society, information security becomes more and more important for humanity 
and new technologies are emerging in an endless stream. Cryptography or cryptology is a 
technology to convert the information from readable state into nonsense, or do the contrary 
transformation. Information transmission and storage can be effectively protected by 
cryptography. Modern cryptography has been rapidly developed since World War II, along 
with the fast progress of electronics and computer science. Symmetric-key cryptography 
and public-key cryptography are two major fields of modern cryptography, depending on if 
encryption and decryption keys are same or not. One of the symmetric encryption 
algorithms named one-time pad (OTP) has been proven to be impossible to crack no matter 
how powerful the computing power is (Shannon, 1949), however, to generate and distribute 
the true random key steam the same size as the plaintext is a rigorous requirement. 
Quantum cryptography can provide a secure approach to exchange keys between legitimate 
users and can be used with OTP to fulfill secure communication sessions. The concept of 
quantum cryptography was originally proposed by Wiesner in 1960s (Wiesner, 1983), 
though its real development should be recorded from the first quantum key distribution 
(QKD) protocol presented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (Bennett, & Brassard, 1984). The 
research fields of quantum cryptography are wider than QKD, including quantum secret 
sharing , quantum authentication, quantum signature and so on. QKD is a major aspect of 
quantum cryptography and will be the only topic discussed in this chapter. Unlike public-
key cryptography, the security of QKD is guaranteed by quantum mechanics rather than 
computational complexity. The most important property of QKD is to detect the presence of 
the behavior to intercept the key information illegally. The single photon used in QKD 
cannot be divided into smaller parts, which means the eavesdropper cannot hold a part of 
the particle then measure it. The eavesdropper cannot precisely duplicate a particle with the 
same quantum state as the original one unknown to her due to the quantum no-cloning 
theorem. To measure an unknown quantum system will cause it to "collapse" from a range 
of possibilities into one of its eigenstates. This character, together with the uncertainty 
principle, ensure the eavesdropper cannot get total information without disturbing the 
original quantum system.  
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In this chapter, a short summary of research status of quantum cryptography and the 
workflow of BB84 protocol is introduced. Then, the security of QKD is discussed and some 
aspects of practical QKD system are focused on. In section 3, the implementation technolgies 
of a secure and stable point-to-point QKD system and QKD network are presented. Some 
field QKD network experiments and their results will be shown in this section. Another 
section will discuss some technical and non-technical aspects of the applications of QKD. 
Finally, a short conclusion aiming at the future trends of QKD is proposed. 
1.1 The research status of quantum cryptography 
The first QKD experiment was implemented by Bennett and Smolin in 1989 (Bennett, et al., 
1992) which opened the gate to real-life QKD. According to the implementation scheme of 
QKD protocol, there are discrete variable, continuous variable and distributed phase 
reference coding. According to the physical carrier of quantum information, there are 
polarization encoding, phase encoding, frequency encoding , amplitude encoding and so on. 
Free-space QKD and fiber QKD can be used as the quantum channel for photon-based QKD. 
Implementation scheme should be selected according to the channel character, the 
performance requirements, the operating condition and so on.  
Fiber is the most widely used quantum channel, in which the polariztion and the phase 
encoding QKD schemes can be applied. Polarization encoding QKD schemes use the 
polarization states of photons to carry key information. Due to the intrinsic birefringence 
effect in fiber, the polarization states of photons are vulnerable to be interfered, which 
affects the polarization encoding rather than the phase encoding QKD system in common 
situation. Although there are some valuable polarization encoding QKD schemes (Ma, et al., 
2008; Liu, et al., 2010), phase encoding QKD is still the major scheme used in fiber quantum 
channel. The encoder and decoder of phase encoding QKD system generally implemented 
with interferometer, which need to be precisely modulated and adjusted to meet the 
interference conditions. Some mature phase encoding systems based on different 
interferomter structures (Ribordy, et al., 1998; Gobby, et al., 2004; Mo, et al., 2005) have been 
proposed. At present, several experiments in fiber over 100Km (Gobby, et al., 2004; Mo, et 
al., 2005; Takesue, et al., 2007; Rosenberg et al., 2009; Stucki, 2009; Liu, et. al., 2010) and pulse 
repetition rate of 10 GHz have been reported (Takesue, et al., 2007). Although fiber is a good 
media to transmit photons and convenient to be integrated with existing optical 
communication network, the attenuation of the channel and the performance of practical 
device still limit the secure key distribution distance. Free space QKD, especially satellite to 
ground QKD is an available method to build a global secure communication network 
(Hughes, et al., 2002; Rarity, et al., 2002). Nowadays, a 144 Km free space QKD link has been 
implemented (Schmitt-Manderbach, et al., 2007) and more experiments aiming to satellite 
QKD are still in progress (Hughes & Nordholt, 2011).  
A lot of countries, including the United State, European Union, Japanese, and China, have 
spent a lot to develop QKD technology, and some world famous project DARPA and 
SECOQC were executed. The 973 Program and 863 program of China have funded to 
support the QKD research from the 1990s. Some companies of quantum technology, such as 
ID Quantique in Swiss, MaigQ in US and Qasky in China, have been set up, and QKD 
systems for both education evaluation and telecom communication have been marketed. 
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1.2 BB84 protocol  
QKD protocol is the agreement of particle preparation, information modulation, signal 
detection and detection results processing, which should be obeyed by communication parties 
in the key distribution sessions. QKD protocols can be divided into two major categories – 
preparation and measurement protocols and entanglement based protocols. The first and the 
most practical implemented QKD protocol, well known as BB84, was originally presented 
with photon polarization. In fact, any two pairs of conjugate states can be used to implement 
the protocol, such as the phase of a photon. The flow of BB84 can be described using photon 
polarization as following, where transmitter named Alice and receiver named Bob: 
1. Information Agreement – Alice and Bob make agreements on the correspondence 
between quantum states and classical bits. For example, 0° and 45°polarization 
represents the binary bit 0, 90°, 135° corresponds to bit 1. 
2. Quantum state preparation and transmission – Alice prepares single photon pulses and 
modulates their states of polarization to one of the four states according to the random 
bits stream she generated, then the pulses are sent to the quantum channel. 
3. Detection – Bob measures the polarization of photons with random selected bases. 
4. Sifting – Bob discloses the bases he used, then Alice tells Bob the bit slots in which she 
used the same modulation bases. They convert these detection results into binary bits 
according to the information agreement rules, thus the sifted key stream is generated.   
 
Fig. 1. Integrated QKD procedure 
To generate a practice usable key stream in which Alice and Bob share uniform random bits 
while Eve has no secret key information, there are still some classical post processing works 
must be fulfilled, such as  error correction and privacy amplification. The complete QKD 
session is shown in Fig. 1. From the diagram, we can see the security of QKD is not only 
depend on quantum processes, but also classical processes such as error correction, 
identification and authentication. The QKD without secure preprocessing and post-processing 
is not really secure. The first key stream used for authentication leads to a chicken-and-egg 
problem, which means QKD is essentially a kind of key expansion technology. 
www.intechopen.com
 Applied Cryptography and Network Security 
 
202 
2. Security of quantum key distribution 
The QKD protocol contains the quantum part and the classical part. In the quantum part, 
quantum states are prepared, transmitted and detected. Assuming that the noisy quantum 
channel can be controlled by the eavesdropper, the security of quantum channel can be 
proved by using the basic quantum mechanics property. A classical channel is necessary to 
apply the sifting, parameter estimation, error correction and privacy amplification to 
generate the final secure key stream. The classical channel should be authenticated with the 
unconditional secure authentication protocol based on 2-universal hash functions. The 
unconditional security analysis of protocols and systems has attracted a lot of attentions 
since the concept of QKD was proposed. 
2.1 Security definition of QKD 
Theoretical physicists have analyzed unconditional security of QKD in many respects. 
Initially, Lo and Chau (Lo, & Chau, 1999) proposed the security analysis with the help of 
quantum computer. Then, Shor and Preskill (Shor,& Preskill, 2000) proved that the security 
of prepare-and-measure protocol is equivalent to entanglement-based protocol, thus 
unconditional security of QKD has been proved combining with the CSS code and 
entanglement distillation and purification (EDP) technology. Without applying the EDP 
technology, the security of QKD with information theory method has been analyzed 
(Renner, 2008). More recently, the security of QKD based on private-entanglement states has 
been analyzed (Horodecki, 2008). Inspired by Horodecki’s mind, Renes and Smith (Renes, & 
Smith, 2007) have analyzed noisy processing which allows some phase errors to be left 
uncorrected without compromising unconditional security of the key.  
Security proof of perfect QKD protocol can be divided into three levels: physical 
explanation, physical proof and quantum information theory proof. Physical explanation is 
based on the no-cloning theorem and the uncertainty principle. Since the quantum state is 
encoded with two non-orthogonal bases, the eavesdropper Eve can not get the full secret 
information without disturbing the quantum state. More precisely, the uncertainty relation 
gives upper bounds on the accuracy by which the outcomes of two incompatible 
measurements can be predicated, the generalized uncertainty principle (Berta, et al., 2010; 
Tomamichel, & Renner, 2011) can be given as 
    min maxH X B H Z E q    (1) 
where X and Z are measurement outcomes with Pauli matrix 
0 1
1 0
X
    
and 
1 0
0 1
     
, the 
min-entropy  minH X B  illustrates Bob’s uncertainty about the measurement outcomes X , 
q quantifies the incompatibility of the two measurements in Bob’s side and Eve’s side 
respectively. The max-entropy  maxH Z E  illustrates Eve’s uncertainty about the measurement 
outcomes Z . From this equation, we find that  the upper bound of Eve’s information can be 
estimated by considering Bob’s measurement outcomes. In case of BB84 protocol, we can apply 
the uncertain principle and estimate upper bound of Eve’s information as the following  
      max min1 - 1 -H Z C H X B h     (2) 
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where h is the binary entropy function,   is the quantum bit error rate. Physical proof is 
based on the entanglement based QKD protocol. Since the entanglement quantum state has 
the monogamy principle, Eve can not get the secret key in case of that Alice and Bob can 
establish the maximal entangled quantum state  1 00 11
2
   . The monogamy 
correlation (Scarani, & Gisin, 2001; Pawlowski, & Brukner, 2009) can be given by  
    2 2, , 8CHSH CHSHG A B G A E    (3) 
where  2 ,CHSHG A B  (  2 ,CHSHG A E ) is the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (Clauser, et al., 
1969)(CHSH) inequality between Alice and Bob (Eve). Information theory proof (Renner, et 
al., 2005) is the most universal security proof, which illustrates the trace distance between 
the practical quantum state and the uniformly distributed perfect quantum state 
 
1
2
practical perfect     (4) 
where  M Tr M M  is the trace normal of an Hermitian operator M , the perfect 
quantum state shared between Alice, Bob and Eve can be given by 
 perfect EveAlice Bob
s S
s s s s 

      (5) 
s  is the secret key shared between Alice and Bob, ǒEve is Eve's quantum state. Since Eve’s 
quantum state has no correlation with Alice and Bob’s quantum state, Eve can get no secret 
key. In case of the trace distance between the practical quantum state and the perfect 
quantum state is lower than  , the practical quantum state has the same property 
comparing with the perfect quantum state with probability at least 1 -  . 
2.2 Security of perfect quantum key distribution protocol 
Suppose that Alice and Bob choose the polarization encoding QKD system in our security 
analysis, the standard prepare-and-measure QKD protocol will be introduced in the 
following section (Li, et al., 2011). In Alice’s side, the classical bit 0 is randomly encoded by 
quantum states |0o  or|45o , the classical bit 1 is randomly encoded by quantum states 
|90o  or |135o . In Bob’s side, he randomly choose rectilinear basis {|0o ,|90o } or 
diagonal basis {|45o , |135o  } to measure the quantum state transmitted through the 
quantum channel. After Bob’s perfect measurement and some classical steps of QKD 
(sifting, parameter estimation, error correction and privacy amplification), secret key bits 
can be shared between Alice and Bob. Following the technique obtained by Shor and 
Preskill, the security of prepare-and-measure QKD protocol is equal to the security of 
entanglement-based QKD protocol, which can be constructed by considering the 
corresponding prepare-and-measure encoding scheme as shown in Fig. 2 . 
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Fig. 2. Entanglement-based protocol with Pauli channel and eavesdropper Eve 
Alice prepares maximally entangled pairs  1 00 11
2 AB AB
   . After applying the 
Hadamard operation randomly to the second part of the pair, she sends Bob half of the pair. 
Bob acknowledges the reception of his state and applies  the Hadamard operation 
randomly. In the security analysis, the most generally noisy channels we need to consider 
are Pauli channels. By considering Eve’s eavesdropping in the Pauli channel, the quantum 
state about Alice, Bob and Eve is given by 
  1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
, , ,
ji u v
uv ij A B E E A E E B B
u v i j
P Q I H H u v i j       (6) 
where 
1 11
1 -12
H
    
 is the perfect Hadamard operator, which means the transformation 
between different bases. Note that the Pauli quantum channel can only introduce bit error 
(  ), phase error (  ) and bit phase error (  ) respectively.  , 0,1uvP u v  means the 
probability of the operator 
1 2
u v
E E   introduced by Eve, which should be normalized by 
, , ,
1uv
u v i j
P  .  , 0,1ijQ i j  means the probability of 1 1jiB AH H  matrix introduced by Alice 
and Bob respectively, which satisfies  
1
4
ijQ   for Alice and Bob’s random choice. After the 
sifting step, the case of i j  will be discarded. We trace out  A1, B1 and Eve’s systems to get 
the following equation 
 
1 2 2 1
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
,
1
2
1
2
u v v u
A E E E E A
AB uv
u v v uu v
A B E E A A E E B A
I I
P
I H H H H I
 

 
                   
  (7) 
After transmitting through the quantum channel, the initially shared maximally entangled 
state can be transformed into Bell states using equation (8). 
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 
 
 
 
1
00 11
2
1
01 10
2
1
00 11
2
1
01 10
2
AB AB
bit AB AB
phase AB AB
bitphase AB AB




 
 
 
 
   (8) 
If the maximally entangled pairs   is transformed into Bell state  , no error will be 
introduced in the quantum channel. However, if the maximally entangled pairs  is 
transformed into Bell states 
bit
  , 
phase
  and 
bitphase
  respectively, the bit error, phase 
error and bitphase error will be introduced by Eve correspondingly. Thus, the bit error rate 
and phase error rate can be given by 
 
bit bit AB bitphase ABbit bitphase
phase phase AB bitphase ABphase bitphase
e
e
     
     
 
    (9) 
Comparing with the previous two equations, we can get the difference between bit error 
rate and phase error rate is - 0bit phasee e  . Thus, the phase error can be accurately estimated 
by the bit error rate in the perfect device case. Thus, the final secret key rate can be given by 
      1 h 1 2bit phase bitR h e e h e         (10) 
2.3 Security of practical quantum key distribution system 
Whereas, security analysis model based on the perfect QKD protocol can not be directly 
applied to the practical QKD system. Gottesman, Lo, Lukenhaus and Preskill (Gottesman, et 
al., 2004) analyzed unconditional security of the practical QKD system and gave the famous 
secret key rate formula GLLP, combining their security analysis result with decoy state 
method (Hwang, 2003; Lo, et al., 2005, Wang, 2005) , which makes practical QKD system can 
be realized with weak coherent light source. But their security analysis can not be applied to 
the practical QKD system with arbitrary imperfections, which will introduce side channel 
attacks. Xu et al (Xu, et al., 2010) have experimentally demonstrated the imperfect phase 
modulator will introduce phase-remapping attack. Lydersen et al (Lydersen, et al., 2010) have 
proposed detector blinding attack with imperfect single photon detector (SPD), they 
demonstrated that imperfect SPD can be fully remote-controlled by utilizing specially tailored 
bright illumination. More recently, Weier et al. (Weier, et al., 2011) have proposed dead time 
attack with imperfect SPD, in which the eavesdropper can exploit the dead time effect of the 
imperfect SPD to gain almost full secret information without being detected. Thus, practical 
QKD device imperfections can lead to various types of attacks, which can’t be covered by the 
unconditional security analysis based on the perfect QKD protocol. Major imperfections and 
attacking methods are summarized in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3. The imperfections of practical QKD system and quantum hacking methods 
Obviously, if the imperfection is basis-dependent, we can consider a slightly changed protocol, 
where the state preparation and measurement are perfect, while there is a virtual unitary 
transformation controlled by Eve introduces the basis-dependent imperfection in the quantum 
channel. Since security of the original protocol is no less than the slightly changed protocol, the 
final secret key rate can be estimated utilizing the GLLP formula. However, most of the 
imperfection in states preparation and measurement are state-dependent, which cannot be 
controlled by Eve in the security analysis. For instance, the wave plate may be inaccurate in 
polarization based QKD system, while the phase modulator may be modulated by inaccurate 
voltage in phase-coding QKD system. If the imperfection cannot be illustrated as an unitary 
transformation, it can’t be considered as part of the quantum channel controlled by Eve.  
2.3.1 Modulation loss of phase encoding QKD system 
Most of real-life QKD implementations are based on phase-coding BB84 protocol, where 
Unbalanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (UMZI) (Gobby, et al., 2004) method is 
commonly used. However, the Phase Modulator (PM) in the interferometer is always 
imperfect, where the arm has the imperfect PM will introduce much more loss than the arm 
has no PM. In this case, photon state emitted by Alice’s side is imperfect BB84 states, which 
we call it unbalanced states in the following. 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
s l
s l
s l
s l
i
i
  
  
  
  




   (11) 
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where, 1 s  is the quantum state in the short arm, 1 l  is the quantum in the long arm after 
the PM. In this equation, the mean photon number of the short arm Ǎ is larger than the mean 
photon number in the long arm   by considering the practical imperfect phase modulator. 
Correspondingly, secret key rate of QKD based on this states can not be estimated with 
GLLP formula directly. To give an optimal security key rate of QKD with unbalanced BB84 
states, we propose that the real-life source can be replaced by a virtual source without 
lowering security (Li, et al., 2010). 
 
Fig. 4. UMZI method QKD with an imaginary unitary transformation and virtual source. 
The unitary transformation does not need to be implemented in practical QKD experimental 
realizations, the detailed illustration of the unitary transformation is given as the following. 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 2
l s A l s A
l s A l s A
l s A l s A l s A
l s A l s A
U
U
U
U n m n m n m
 
 


 
  
   (12) 
where, 0 A  and 1 A  are mutually orthogonal states. We can simply test and verify that the 
real-life setup of Alice can be replaced by the virtual source combining with the basis-
independent unitary transformation. Obviously, we can even assume the unitary 
transformation is controlled by Eve, then the security of practical QKD setup is no less than 
the security of QKD with the virtual source. 
2.3.2 Imperfect state preparation and measurement 
We apply the entanglement distillation and purification (EDP) technology by considering 
the most general imperfect state modulation, and a much better secret key rate under 
constant imperfect parameters has been analyzed in comparation with previous works (Li, 
et al., 2011). The states prepared by Alice and measured by Bob both have individual 
imperfections as in Fig. 5, and the whole security analysis can be divided into two steps 
based on an virtual protocol as in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 5. The most general imperfect states preparation and measurement in practical QKD 
experimental realization. 
 
Fig. 6. Entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol with imperfect devices. 
Firstly, we consider that Alice prepares perfect entangled quantum state pairs, then she keeps 
half of the perfect entangled quantum state and sends half of the imperfect modulated 
quantum state to Bob, which illustrates the imperfect states preparation. Meanwhile, Bob 
applies perfect Hadamard transformation in the receiver's side, thus Alice and Bob can share 
the maximally entangled quantum state utilizing the EDP technology. Secondly, Alice applies 
perfect measurement with her maximally entangled quantum states, and Bob applies imperfect 
measurement with his entangled quantum states correspondingly, finally they can establish the 
raw key. Since the phase error introduced by Bob's imperfect measurement should not be 
controlled by Eve, we can get a much higher secret key rate correspondingly. The similar result 
has also been proved that adding noise in the classical post processing can improve the secret 
key rate by considering that the phase errors introduced in the post processing can not be 
controlled by Eve (Renner, et al., 2005). Comparing with the above security analysis result, the 
noise introduced by the imperfect device is precisely known by Eve, while the imperfection can 
not be corrected or controlled by Eve due to the random encoding choice. Thus, the exactly 
known but can’t be controlled imperfection is similar to adding noise model (Kraus et al., 2005). 
3. Realization of quantum key distribution – From point-to-point to network 
The QKD system based on weak coherent pulses (WCP) is the most mature QKD technology 
up to date. The coherent laser pulse is attenuated to the single photon level, where photons 
are not equally distributed over the pulse train. The average photon number of 0.1 is an 
accepted secure threshold before decoy state is prompted. The most advantage of WCP 
QKD system is that the conventional diode lasers and standard single-mode optical fibers of 
1550nm can be used, so that the transmission length can get maximum and the system can 
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be realized and integrated into the current fiber network at reasonable price. Here we focus 
on phase encoding WCP QKD system and fiber QKD network. Security, stability, 
integration and cost are major aspects of a practical QKD system. We should setup QKD 
systems with available light sources, encoder, decoder and detector. The flaw between 
theoretical model and practical devices must be filled by technical skills at acceptable cost . 
3.1 Faraday-Michelson QKD system 
A typical fiber QKD scheme is based on fiber Mach–Zehnder (M-Z) interferometers, which 
are unstable due to the polarization fluctuation caused by environment associated fiber 
birefringence (Han, et al., 2004). The polarization controllers and polarization recovery 
sessions are necessary in M-Z system to keep the system continuously operating. We 
presented a Faraday-Michelson (F-M) QKD system which is intrinsic-stable in fiber channel 
(Mo, et al., 2005). The Faraday rotate mirror can change any imcoming polarization state 
into its orthogonal state. The system uses this effect to automatically compensate the 
polarization fluctuation of the fiber channel and the system optical units. The BB84 F-M 
QKD system with decoy states is implemented, as show in Fig. 7. The quantum and the sync 
light pulses are generated using different lasers. The energy of the quantum light pulses are 
attenuated to the single-photon level, then be randomly modulated by the intensity 
modulator to generate the decoy-state pulses. Alice applies driving signals to her phase 
modulator to randomly encode binary information onto the photons, with phases of 0, Ǒ/2, 
Ǒ and 3Ǒ/2. The receiver Bob also randomly modulates the four phases of his phase 
modulator, then the interference results are delivered into an InGaAs/InP avalanche single 
photon detector (SPD). According to the BB84 protocol, the bases are divided into two sets 
consisting of {0, Ǒ} and {Ǒ/2, 3Ǒ/2}, in which phases 0 and Ǒ/2 denote bit 0, while Ǒ and 3Ǒ/2 
denote bit 1. The users declare the basis sets they selected in every time bin in which the 
receiver detected photons, and the sifted keys with the same basis sets are kept. 
 
Fig. 7. The schematic diagram of Faraday-Michelson QKD system. Sync LD: 
Synchronization laser diode; Quant LD: Quantum laser diode; IM: intensity modulator; 
VOA: Variable optical attenuator; PM: Phase modulator; FM: Faraday rotator mirror; 
DWDM: Dense wavelength division multiplexer; SPD: Single photon detector. 
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3.1.1 Implementation essentials of secure QKD system  
3.1.1.1 The decoy states 
The quantum light source used in the system is the weak coherent pulse laser which follows 
Poisson distribution and has a chance to prepare multi-photo pulses. The multi-photon part 
of the quantum signal is vulnerable to photon-number splitting (PNS) attack. Decoy state is 
proposed to resist the PNS attack by randomly modulating the average photon number of 
quantum signal. The kernel of decoy method is to estimate the lower bound of the secret key 
generated by the single photon state. More precisely, applying the formula of key 
generation rate (GLLP) with practical source as the following 
     1 1 11 1
2
r Y P h e Q h E        (13) 
where, r is the final secret key rate, 1/2 is the sifting efficiency, Y1 is the yield of the single 
photon state, P1 is the proportion of the single photon state, e1 is the quantum bit error rate 
(QBER) of the single photon state, QǍ is the gain of the signal photon states, EǍ is the QBER 
of the signal photon states, h is the binary Shannon information function. From the secret 
key rate formula, the upper bound of e1 and the lower bound of Y1 can be estimated. In 
practical side, suppose Alice and Bob choose decoy states with expected photon number ǎ, 
then Y1 and e1 can be given by 
 
2 2 2 2
1 2 2
2
1
1
1
2
e
Y Q e Q e Q E e
Q E
e
Y e
      
 

   
   



         

 (14) 
Combining this inequations with GLLP formula, the final secret key rate can be analyzed 
with the decoy state method. Note that the security of decoy state QKD protocol is based on 
that eavesdropper can not distinguish the signal state and decoy state with the same photon 
number. 
The modulation speed of IM is same as the quantum signal generation rate, and the average 
photon number is randomly modulated to 0.6 and 0.2, which is used for signal and decoy 
states respectively. To generate the vacuum state, the quant laser will not be triggered. The 
ratio of the signal pulse, decoy pulse and vacuum pulse is 6:3:1 in the system. 
3.1.1.2 The single SPD scheme 
In regular BB84 system, two single photon detectors are necessary, which correspond to 
bit 0 and bit 1 individually, and Bob only perform two-basis modulation. Due to the 
quantum efficiency mismatch of the multi-SPDs, these schemes are vulnerable to practical 
attack like fake-state attack and time-shift attack. In our system, the standard BB84 
modulation pattern is modified. We use only a single SPD with the four-state modulation 
in Bob’s side. This scheme has advantages to resist these kinds of attacks, but loses half of 
the detection events. 
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3.1.1.3 For trojan attack  
There are two optical circulators in the system. The optical circulators are used to make the 
system to immunize from Trojan attack, in which Eve would inject a bright light to the 
system and get information from reflected light. The optical circulator can restrain the light 
path as follows: the light incomes from port 1 will exits from port2, and the light from port2 
will emit to port 3, as shown in Fig. 8. The bright light detectors of Alice and Bob are used to 
detect Trojan attack. 
 
Fig. 8. The light path of optical circulator 
3.1.1.4 For bright illumination attack 
The bright light detector in Bob’s side is not only for detecting Trojan attack, but also for 
detecting bright illumination attack. The bright light emits into detection system will be 
reflected by the Faraday rotator mirror and split by a fiber optical coupler, the reflection 
light will be guided by optical circulator and reaches the bright light detector. The total 
loss of the bright illumination light is about 3.5~4.5 dB. Since the light power used to 
effectively blind the SPD is regularly in the level of ǍW~mW, it can be detected by 
conventional bright light detectors. 
3.1.2 The measures to keep system stable 
3.1.2.1 Self-compensation of birefringence 
Since the perfect interference requires exactly the same photon polarization, the 
birefringence also has influence to the phase encoding system. The unbalanced Michelson 
interferometer combined with Faraday rotator mirror can effectively compensate the 
birefringence of the fiber devices and channel. The Faraday rotator mirror is designed to 
rotate a signal's state of polarization (SOP) by 90°. Once 45° when the light enters, and again 
when the light is reflected back. Since the Faraday effect is non-reciprocal, the resultant SOP 
is rotated by 90° with respect to the original signal. The birefringence of the fiber channel 
can be self-compensated thanks to this character of Faraday rotator mirror (Mo, et al., 2005). 
3.1.2.2 Synchronization 
The SPD used in the system is based on InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiode (APD), which 
can respond to a single photon. This kind of APD needs to operate in Geiger mode to 
achieve single photon sensitivity with a low dark count rate. The gating signals of narrow 
pulses should be added to the bias when the photons arrive, so that sync signals for gating 
are necessary. Typically, there are two means to transfer synchronization light pulse - to use 
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a standalone fiber or combine the sync single into the quantum channel. Although the 
crosstalk from sync light is minimum in the former scheme, the time base drift caused by the 
environment and the length difference between two fibers must be well compensated. The 
timing drift of the latter scheme is much smaller, but the crosstalk should be effectively 
reduced. Here we chose the one-fiber scheme not only for gating time stabilization but also 
to save the fiber sources. In order to suppress the interference from sync light, conventional 
avalanche photodiodes with typical sensitivites of -35dbm are used as sync detectors, which 
denotes the power of the sync light can be attenuated much.   
3.1.2.3 Phase drift compensation 
The phase drift is a common problem in phase encoding QKD system, and must be solved for 
long time operating QKD sessions, as shown in Fig. 9 (Chen, et al., 2008). Generally, there are 
three methods to solve the problem: Modify the structure of interferometers such as ”plug-
and-play” configuration to auto-compensate the phase shift. Use passive compensation to 
reduce the negative effect of environment fluctuations by strict thermal and mechanical 
isolation. Acquire drift parameters by active phase tracking then perform compensation. Here, 
we proposed a four-phase scanning software compensation method without adding 
additional reference light or hardware feedback unit (Zhang, et al., 2010). The software method 
is more suitable for high speed QKD system, because the reference light for compenstation 
maybe cause severe crosstalk to quantum signal in this senerio. The four-phase scanning 
method bases on the interference fringe and the coding matrix. The interference fringe is the 
curve of the relationship between the SPD counts and the phase difference between Alice’s 
and Bob’s phase modulator. Either site, for example Alice, fixes its phase modulation voltage 
as Vref which denotes the corresponding phase shift as φref. The opposite site, i.e. Bob scans its 
phase modulation voltage from 0 to the full scale range of the DAC (its output voltage controls 
the phase shift) in a number of steps. In our setup, the phase modulation voltage ranging from 
-6V to 6V corresponds the phase shift ranging from 0 rad to more than 2Ǒ rad. Therefore, 
scanning the control voltage will traverse 0 to 2Ǒ phase differences, as shown in Fig. 10. 
 
Fig. 9. Phase drift in a QKD experiment 
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Fig. 10. Interference fringe 
At each scanning step, Alice transmits a certain number of photons, meanwhile Bob 
records the number of photons detected by SPD, so we can get the curve of counting 
intensity versus the phase difference. The process fixing A-side at Va, ref and traversing B-
side is called scanning B (relative to Va, ref). Through the interference fringe from the 
scanning B, we could get two important parameters on B-side modulator. One is the half-
wave voltage (denoted by Vb, half), which is the voltage difference of the half cycle of the 
interference fringe. The second parameter is the destructive interference voltage, which is 
the voltage at the valley of the interference fringe, and is denoted as Vb, ref±Ǒ. The phase 
difference between voltages Va, ref and Vb, ref±Ǒ is Ǒ. By the process scanning A, we can get 
these two parameters for A-side modulator, they are Va, half and Va, ref±Ǒ. The flow of 
algorithm is described below: 
Step 1. Alice gets the half-wave voltage (Va,half) by scanning her interference fringe. 
Assuming its zero phase modulation voltage is Va,0, Alice can estimate her voltages 
for the four phase shifts (Va,0, Va,Ǒ/2, Va,Ǒ, Va,3Ǒ/2) as (Va,0,Va,0+1/2Va,half, Va,0+Va,half, 
Va,0+3/2Va,half), respectively.  
Step 2. Setting Alice’s phase modulation voltage VAlice,ref as 0, Ǒ/2, Ǒ, 3Ǒ/2 in turn, Bob 
scans his interference fringes. From these four interference fringes, Bob obtains 
his destructive interference voltages as (Vb,0±Ǒ, Vb,Ǒ/2±Ǒ, Vb,Ǒ±Ǒ, Vb,3Ǒ/2±Ǒ). These are 
exactly equal to Bob’s four phase modulating voltages (Vb,Ǒ, Vb,3Ǒ/2, Vb,0, Vb,Ǒ/2). 
Step 3. By checking the difference between the ideal coding matrix and the calculated 
coding matrix, Alice’s four phase modulation voltages (Va,0, Va,Ǒ/2, Va,Ǒ, Va,3Ǒ/2) 
are tuned and step2 and step3 are repeated until the difference is sufficiently 
small. Then the current voltages (Va,0, Va,Ǒ/2, Va,Ǒ, Va,3Ǒ/2) and their scanning 
results (Vb,Ǒ, Vb,3Ǒ/2, Vb,0, Vb,Ǒ/2) will be used in the normal transmission process. 
The diagram of the algorithm flow and the results of the experiment is shown in 
Fig. 11. 
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Fig. 11. Flow diagram of the four-phase scanning method and the experiment result. (a) 
Flow diagram, (b) QBER record of QKD experiment over 1 hours, (c) QBER statistic result. 
The Faraday-Michelson (F-M) QKD system has been tested in 125Km dark fiber from Beijing 
to Tianjin in China in 2004. The QBER was less than 6%, which was mainly limited by the 
dark count of SPD. This scheme is used as the physical layer apparatus in our next QKD 
network experiments. 
3.2 QKD network 
A point-to-point system is not enough to satisfy network communication requirements in 
real life, so building a quantum key distribution network is not only necessary but also 
crucial to practical quantum cryptography. Unfortunately, the quantum mechanics make 
usual network routing methods invalid while keeping the QKD system secure. There are 
several difficulties to build QKD network. 
1. The power of signal is limited at the  single-photon level and can’t be amplified, which 
indicates that it is possible but infeasible to get enough signal to noise ratio (SNR) by 
increasing the light power. 
2. The signal can’t be relayed in a classical measure and resend manner. Furthermore, it is 
hard to encode the light signal due to the fiber loss. It indicates the packet switching 
used in internet is no longer applicable. 
The switch units in QKD network can be divided into three categories: optical unit, trusted 
relay, and quantum repeater. Among them, quantum repeater is still in the lab research 
stage and far away from real-life applications. Trusted relay requires the quantum signals to 
be converted into classical binary key bits, so that the quantum features of the keys are 
eliminated. The security controls of the sites where trusted relay located will become a 
serious problem while the network scale expands. For now, in existing QKD network, 
trusted relay is the most available approach to prolong the key distribution distance. Optical 
components can keep the quantum features of the particles, however the secure key 
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distribution distance can’t be extended. So far several optical QKD network schemes have 
been presented. In the 1990s, A looped and branched network was firstly proposed 
(Townsend, et al., 1994), then QKD sessions between one controller and several terminals in 
a branched network were demonstrated, in which the kernel part is a beam splitter 
(Towsend, 1997). After that, several QKD local network topologies have been proposed with 
optical methods (Nishioka, et al., 2002; Kumavor , et al., 2006; Fernandez, et al., 2007; Ma, et 
al., 2007; Zhang, et al., 2008 ). In this chapter, we will focus on the metropolitan fiber QKD 
networks set up by optical components. 
3.2.1 A QKD network scheme 
Here we propose a star topology QKD network based on wavelength-division multiplexing 
(WDM) in which all users can exchange keys directly and simultaneously, which we call 
real-time full connectivity (RTFC) network. The center of the network is a “QKD router” 
(QR). For an N-user network, the QR has N ports and each user connects to one port of the 
QR via a fiber. A user transfers photons of different wavelengths to the QR and these 
photons are delivered to a certain user according to their wavelengths. For any two users 
who want to communicate with each other, a unique wavelength is assigned to them and 
this is regarded as an address code for the destination of the photons. This scheme provides 
unique optical links between each two pairs of transmitters and receivers, and arbitrary 
point-to-point fiber QKD systems can be used as physical equipments into the network. The 
only change for point-to-point system is that two multiplexers are added into the 
communication link. However, the maximum secure transmission distance will be reduced 
a little due to the additional insertion loss. 
 
Fig. 12. Structure of four-user QKD router and the star network topology. DeMux: 
demultiplexer. 
www.intechopen.com
 Applied Cryptography and Network Security 
 
216 
As an example, a four-user QKD network is used to describe the topology, as shown in 
Fig. 12. The router is composed of three-wavelength WDMs. When Alice wants to send 
quantum signal to Bob, she selects wavelength ǌ1 corresponding to the specific connection 
inside the router, as shown in Fig. 12. These photons will be demultiplexed by WDM1 and 
transmitted to WDM2 through the link ǌ1 between WDM1 and WDM2, then forwarded to 
Bob. Alice can transmit photons of ǌ1, ǌ2 and ǌ3 at the same time in principle, then she can 
exchange keys with Bob, David and Charlie simultaneously, although the cost will 
increase. The operations of all other users are the same as for Alice. The network can be 
extended to N users, concurring with the edge coloring theorem in graph theory. Each 
WDM, link, and wavelength corresponds to a vertex, edge and color in the graph, 
respectively. From the edge coloring theorem, N-1 colors are required to render a 
complete graph with N vertices when N is even, and N colors when N is odd. This means 
that for an N-port router, each WDM should be an N-1 (when N is even) or N (when N is 
odd) wavelength multiplexer. As the network expanding, crosstalk will become the main 
constraint. 
The crosstalk of the QKD network can be termed as interband (intraband) crosstalk, the 
wavelength of which falls outside (inside) the same wavelength band as the signal. The 
interband crosstalk can be removed by narrow-band filter (NBF) in principle. Using thin 
filmfilter 100GHz dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) filter, less than -32dB 
(-48dB) adjacent (non-adjacent) channel crosstalk can be obtained experimentally. The 
maximum QBER caused by 40 interband crosstalk will be 0.5×10-3.2×2+0.5×10-
4.8×38≈0.10%, which validates that the interband crosstalk can be neglected in such a small 
size QKD network. The intraband crosstalk, which can be categorized into coherent and 
incoherent crosstalk, can’t be eliminated by NBF and will cause non-ignorable QBER. 
Assuming the counting probabilities of signal and crosstalk photons are as and ac. The 
total photon counting probability of the coherent crosstalk should be 
|as+ac|=|as|2+|ac|2+2Re[asac*], while in the incoherent crosstalk, the third component is 0 
in long time statistic. The intraband crosstalk in the network is mainly caused by the 
multi-path reflection of the quantum signal itself and the same wavelength photons from 
other users’ lasers. The photons from different lasers are generally considered to be 
incoherent. Since the fiber length in the router is generally much longer than the 
coherence length of the laser, the mulit-path crosstalk from the same laser is also 
incoherent. Furthermore, the multi-path crosstalk here can be neglected while taking the 
return loss of WDM into account. 
In QKD network, the average photon number of each user’s quantum signal should be fixed 
and equal when they access into the fiber link, therefore the power penalty model is not 
suitable for evaluating QKD network. The crosstalk photons generate photon counting only 
when they fall into the “Geiger” mode SPD triggering gate, and there will be no bit error 
when the signal and crosstalk photons arrive simultaneously. Thus the maximum QBER is 
occurred when the crosstalk photons entirely unoverlap with the signal photons, and can be 
depicted as 
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where V is the fringe visibility of the optical system, which is around 98% in our system. pdark 
is the dark count rate of SPD, q is the protocol efficiency which is 0.5 with BB84. Ǎ is the 
average photon number of the signal and crosstalk accessing into the quantum channel. δ is 
the system-related loss, which is 1/2 in F-M system. γ is the insertion loss of the router 
(typically 2.5dB). ǃ≈0.2dB/km is fiber loss factor. η is the detector’s quantum efficient, which 
is about 10% typically. Lc and Ls is the fiber length of crosstalk and signal link respectively. 
nc is the number of the crosstalk and ǂ=32dB is the isolation of the router. 
 
(a) (b) 
Fig. 13. (a) Simulation result of maximum QBER as a function of intraband crosstalk number 
and fiber distance, the QBER of the black filled area is more than secure threshold of 11.8%; 
(b) Experimental results of the maximum QBER of 0, 4 and 10 intraband crosstalk sources in 
the network, lines are the theoretical value and points are the experimental. 
Since simplex transmission is enough to fulfill QKD, only (N-1)/2 or N/2 homodyne links 
will exist in an odd or even user number QKD network, respectively. Using the parameters 
in the field experiment and assuming Lc=0, in which the most critical situation is, the 
maximum QBER of the network is simulated and experimentally evaluated in lab, as shown 
in Fig. 13. The result indicates that it is possible to build a 200-user QKD network covering a 
50km diameter metropolis with the basic QBER requirement. The QBER lower than 5% is 
generally required to effectively generate secure key if we take practical post processing of 
decoy into account, so that the valid user number will be a little reduced to 80-100.   
 
Fig. 14. Two structures of the basic unit. ǌ1 …ǌN are N wavelengths band of WDM, and 
arrows mark directions. 
Wavelength is a strained communication resource. We proposed a wavelength-saving RTFC 
QKD network scheme utilizing the simplex character of QKD (Wang, et al., 2010). The QKD 
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network with the new topology can support 2N + 1 nodes only with N wavelengths, which 
saves about 50% of the wavelengths compared with the previous topology. The wavelength-
saving topology employs the basic unit consisting of one three-port circulator (CIR) and two 
N-wavelength WDMs as show in Fig. 14 (a)Fig. 13, or one N-wavelength WDM and N three-
port CIRs Fig. 14 (b). This basic unit can be regarded as a multiplexer joining N input signals 
together and a demultiplexer splitting N output signals apart, denoted as M&D. 
As an example, Fig. 15 shows the topology of a five-node RTFC QKD network with two 
wavelengths. Every node connects to the QKD router, which is composed of five 1 × 4 
M&Ds. When node A wants to share secret keys with B, its QKD transmitter A2B sends 
photons of wavelength ǌ1 to its M&D, which multiplexes these photons to the optical fiber 
channel; while arriving at the router, these photons will propagate from port 1 to 2, then 
forward to B and be demultiplexed by the M&D, and finally received by the corresponding 
B QKD receiver A2B. At the same time, node A wants to share other keys with D, which 
would be required to send photons of wavelength ǌ2 to A. Therefore, A can transmit 
photons of wavelength ǌ1 and ǌ2 to B and C, and receive photons of wavelength ǌ2 and ǌ1 
from D and E, respectively, simultaneously. Every node in this architecture is on the same 
term, so every two nodes can share secure keys directly at the same time only with two 
wavelengths. Because photons in the network propagate is unidirectional (only from one 
node to the other), any one-way P2P QKD system can be applied on this QKD network 
independently. According to the Hamiltonian circuits theorem in odd complete graph 
theory (Deo, 1974). 
 
Fig. 15. Schematic diagram of the five-node QKD network topology with two wavelengths. 
A, B, C, D, and E are the five nodes, and 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are the five ports of the QKD router. 
Arrows indicate the propagation direction of the photons. 
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3.2.2 The QKD network in field 
Some field QKD networks ,such as the DARPA (Elliott, et al., 2006), the SECOQC (Peev, et 
al., 2009) and the Tokyo QKD network (Sasaki et al, 2011) have been reported in the world. 
In China, the first field metropolitan QKD network with four users was implemented in the 
commercial backbone fiber network of China Netcom Company Ltd (CNC) in Beijing, 2007 
(Chen, et al., 2009). The longest distance between two users is 42 Km and the shortest is 32 
Km. The decoy state F-M QKD system was implemented in the network. 
In 2009, A more complex QKD network was implemented in Wuhu, the five users nodes in 
which located in government bureaus (Xu, et al., 2009). The structure of the network is 
shown in  Fig. 16(a). In this network, we constructed different priorities by considering the 
requirement of the bureaus. For four important nodes, a high-level full mesh backbone 
network was built among them and each of them can also operate as a trust relay to expand 
the net. Two of the others belonged to a subnet, linked with an optical switch matrix to one 
trust relay node shown as Node “D” in the diagram of the backbone network. In addition, 
we used one single telecom fiber to add the seventh node into the network, for both the 
classic network connection and QKD distribution, to infer the potential of our QKD network 
even if the fiber channel is limited. The whole quantum cryptographic network was built on 
the inner-city telecom fiber cables with the distribution in the satellite map of  Fig. 16 (b). 
The network was totally implemented with decoy state QKD systems and the wave-length 
saving scheme was adopted.  
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
 
Fig. 16. (a) Structure of the hierarchical quantum cryptographic network, which contains 
techniques of QKD router, trust relay and switch router. A to G stand for seven different 
terminal nodes, which linked to the backbone in the red dash square and the subnet in the 
blue dash circle individually. (b) Distribution map of the nodes in the network. Node A 
located in the Bureau of Science and Technology. B stands for the building of Economic 
Committee. C was in the office of General Labour Union. R stands for the QKD router, 
which located in the same telecom station with Node D. The backbone network was 
composed of these four nodes. E and F belonged to the subnet, and was settled in the 
Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision and the Civic Commerce Stimulus Bureau 
respectively. G was in the telecom station as well. 
www.intechopen.com
 Applied Cryptography and Network Security 
 
220 
 A2R2B A2R2C C2R2E C2R2F 
Wavelength (nm) 1530 1550 1530 1550 
Attenuation (dB) 7.24 8.78 14.77 10.79 
Sifted key (kbps) 31.00 17.64 3.83 8.16 
QBER (%) 2.92 2.84 3.76 2.78 
Secure key (kbps) 4.91 2.02 0.41 1.82 
Table 1. Field test results for QKD network 
The clock of the system was 20MHz, and the test results are shown in Table 1. Using the 
secure key bits generated by QKD sessions, encrypted tele-meetings between the Bureaus in 
the network were demonstrated. With the quantum systems used in the network, the key 
generation rate was insufficient for one-time-pad encryption of high bit rate multimedia 
data stream, and so therefore, the advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm with the 
128-bit key stream updated every one minute was implemented. The low bit rate speech 
data in the link A2R2B, text messages and confidential files in all links were transmitted 
using a one-time-pad encryption. 
4. Application of quantum cryptography 
Here we would like to survey the quantum cryptography from the user’s point of view. 
Maybe some of the viewpoints expressed here are not original nor objective. These 
perspectives only represent our understandings of quantum cryptography.  
4.1 The application motivation 
Undoubtedly, security is the top power to drive scientists, engineers to research quantum 
cryptography and the customers to keep a watchful eye on this technology. The problems 
asked by customers may be like if this quantum “unconditional security” can be really 
realized? and what benefits can this unconditional security bring? How much will it cost? 
and so on. The customers can be divided into three categories, the representative of which 
are academy, government, and business users. The academical customers is similar to the 
researchers, scientific research is their major motivation to adopt quantum cryptography, 
so that they are regarded as researchers rather than customers. This part of market is 
limited and no rapid growth can be anticipated. The requirements of the government are 
a little complex. The perfect secure communication is attractive for the government. On 
the other hand, they need to keep ability to monitor the communication in necessary 
occasions in order to keep national security. The contradiction is their original driving 
force to support quantum cryptography development. This kind of users are strictly care 
the real-life security rather than cost. The business customers such as group corporations 
also have remote secure data transfer requirements. There are some motivations to make 
customers update their technologies when the existing solutions have been adopted: 
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necessary upgrading functions, much cheaper payments, much more effective or 
convenient way. In the view of these users, the benefits and the cost must be seriously 
evaluated. 
After more than 20 years of development, quantum cryptography has been understood by 
a lot of people. The gap between the theoretical description and the real-life realization of 
quantum cryptography is also well known. Especially, the quantum hacking experiments 
published in 2010 even lead to a crisis of confidence of quantum cryptography. Since it is 
well known that unconditional security equals to unconditional investment, making 
people aware of the weakness of quantum cryptography is not an aggravating situation, 
but the necessary step to make quantum cryptography technology mature. After that, the 
proper usage manners and conditions of quantum cryptography can be declared 
correctly.   
From the vendors’ and researchers’ point of view, the investment of information safety is still 
not enough and the road of the commercial QKD is full of obstacles. Even if the acceptable 
security of quantum cryptography is guaranteed, its function is still limited. The information 
security generally includes storage security, transmission security, authentication security, 
perimeter security and management security. Quantum cryptography can’t solve all these 
problems.  Besides, conventional cryptographers are also developing new crypto technologies 
to resist future attacking, such as quantum computation, in a much cheaper price than QKD, 
so that the cost performance will be a critical factor for business users. 
4.2 Technology maturity 
The secure key generation rate, the maximum key distribution distance, the quantum 
channel requirements are main technical roadblocks in real-life QKD. At present, the light 
pulse repetition rate has reached 10GHz and the distance over 200Km, the secure key rate in 
50Km fiber can be over 1Mbps, which can support OTP video encryption. The commercial 
communication for a single mode optical fiber bandwidth has reached 40Gbps and the 
systems aim at 400Gbps to 1Tbps are in developing. The key generation performance of 
QKD is far from that record, so that its applications are limited in low speed communication 
occasions when adopting OTP. Besides that, QKD is mainly restrained in metropolitan area 
due to its maximum transmission distance. The research achievements of quantum repeater 
and satellite QKD would help to overcome the defect, however, the trusted relay is still the 
only choice for now.  
The requirement of quantum channel either in fiber or in free space is a serious problem, 
which is in contradiction with the tendency of network evolution. A single fiber core is 
necessary to be a quantum channel, due to the SNR requirement. The nonlinear effects of 
fiber, for example Raman scatting, will lead to a disastrous SNR when the bright light for 
communication and the quantum signal are transmitted in a single fiber. In short distance, 
continuous variable QKD scheme may be a usable countermeasure to resist noise 
interference. However, the real effective scheme to work properly under practical SNR has 
not emerged yet. The free space channel needs directly visible light path, the good 
atmospheric condition, and the acceptable SNR, which denotes the valid work time is 
severely limited.  
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4.3 Policies, legal and other non-technical obstacles 
Cryptography is a strictly controlled technology in all countries. The evaluation and 
certification must be executed by a special government department following a 
standardization procedure. The certification is also necessary for business customers to make 
use of quantum cryptography. A lot of theoretical and experimental works must be achieved 
to establish the standard for production, security estimation and application of quantum 
cryptography. Besides, to find the balance between security protection and security control is 
not only the technical problem for academia, but also for policy makers of the government.  
It is difficult for conventional crypto venders to confirm quantum cryptography. Most of the 
classical cryptographers do not really understand quantum mechanics and have no 
confidence in quantum cryptography (Lo, 1999). Moreover, some of them are hostile to 
quantum computation and quantum cryptography, since many classical productions will be 
no longer in force if these technology become veritable. The benefit alteration will cause a lot 
of resistance. The new growth points should be vigorously exploited rather than make 
division from the existing market. 
5. Conclusion and future trends 
In this chapter we surveyed the concept, security and realization of quantum cryptography, 
which has huge potentials to achieve physical security. Quantum cryptography is a 
revolutionary cryptographic technology, which has attracted the attention of various 
counties over either industrial or academic community. Although great achievements have 
been achieved in the past 20 years, there are still a lot of real-life difficulties must be 
overcome. At the end of the chapter, we would like to shortly infer some future 
evolutionary trends of quantum cryptography.  
 
Fig. 17. The road to real-life QKD 
Several stages on the road to real-life QKD are shown in Fig. 17. As the prime value, the 
security loopholes of real-life quantum cryptography system won’t be too careful to be 
assessed. The key generation rate will be nonsense if the security of the procedure can not be 
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guaranteed. This project requires the joint efforts of many people from different areas such 
as scientists, engineers and users. Especially, quantum hackers are necessary to make 
quantum cryptography more reliable, while the persuasion to develop QKD rather than 
destroy it should be kept in mind. The root of the quantum hacking is that we use the 
untrusted classical devices to perform the practical QKD system, thus how to establish the 
standard of various devices is very important in future research of the security of practical 
QKD systems. 
To improve the key distribution rate is still an important aspect of futer research, even if the 
QKD system which can generate Mbps secury key stream over 50 Km fiber channel has been 
demonstrated (Dixon, et al., 2008). The development step maybe retarded due to the 
performance limitation of SPD, modulation, post procession, and so on. The next hot 
research area will be in engineering field rather than physical area, aiming at making the 
effective and economic QKD equipment to be integrated into existing security 
infrastructure.  
Networking is a nature evolution way of QKD. The infrastructure of large scale QKD 
networks is still immature. The quantum repeater to extend the secure transmission 
distance, the technolgy to integrate QKD network into exsisting optical communication 
network will be the hot research field. The real quantum cryptography network, in which 
the end users can use it in their real-life information transfer applications will be the next 
milestone.  
At last, as the core of industry, standards for security evaluation, the production, and the 
application of QKD are already in development (ETSI, 2011) and will continuously attract 
the attention of researchers. 
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